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The Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands, fought during 25–27 October 1942, sometimes referred to as the Battle of Santa Cruz or in Japanese sources as the , was the fourth carrier battle of the Pacific campaign of World War II and the fourth major naval engagement fought between the United States Navy and the Imperial Japanese Navy during the lengthy and strategically important Guadalcanal campaign. In similar fashion to the battles of Coral Sea, Midway, and the Eastern Solomons, the ships of the two adversaries were rarely in direct visual range of each other. Instead, almost all attacks by both sides were mounted by carrier or land-based aircraft. In an attempt to drive Allied forces from Guadalcanal and nearby islands and end the stalemate that had existed since September 1942, the Imperial Japanese Army planned a major ground offensive on Guadalcanal for 20–25 October 1942. In support of this offensive, and with the hope of engaging Allied naval forces, Japanese carriers and other large warships moved into a position near the southern Solomon Islands. From this location, the Japanese naval forces hoped to engage and decisively defeat any Allied (primarily U.S.) naval forces, especially carrier forces, that responded to the ground offensive. Allied naval forces also hoped to meet the Japanese naval forces in battle, with the same objectives of breaking the stalemate and decisively defeating their adversary. The Japanese ground offensive on Guadalcanal was under way in the Battle for Henderson Field while the naval warships and aircraft from the two adversaries confronted each other on the morning of 26 October 1942, just north of the Santa Cruz Islands. After an exchange of carrier air attacks, Allied surface ships were forced to retreat from the battle area with one carrier sunk and another heavily damaged. The participating Japanese carrier forces, however, also retired because of high aircraft and aircrew losses plus significant damage to two carriers. Although a tactical victory for the Japanese in terms of ships sunk and damaged, the loss of many irreplaceable, veteran aircrews would prove to be a long term strategic advantage for the Allies, whose aircrew losses in the battle were relatively low and could be quickly replaced. The high casualties for the Japanese prevented their carrier forces from further significant involvement in the battle for Guadalcanal, contributing to the eventual Allied victory in that campaign. ==Background== On 7 August 1942, Allied forces (primarily U.S.) landed on Japanese-occupied Guadalcanal, Tulagi, and Florida Islands in the Solomon Islands. The landings on the islands were meant to deny their use by the Japanese as bases for threatening the supply routes between the U.S. and Australia, and to secure the islands as starting points for a campaign with the eventual goal of neutralising the major Japanese base at Rabaul while also supporting the Allied New Guinea campaign. The landings initiated the six-month-long Guadalcanal campaign.〔Hogue, ''Pearl Harbor to Guadalcanal'', p. 235–236.〕 After the Battle of the Eastern Solomons from 24-25 August, in which the aircraft carrier was heavily damaged and forced to travel to Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, for a month of major repairs, three U.S. carrier task forces remained in the South Pacific area. The task forces included the carriers , , and plus their respective air groups and supporting surface warships, including battleships, cruisers, and destroyers, and were primarily stationed between the Solomons and New Hebrides (Vanuatu) islands. At this location, the carriers were charged with guarding the line of communication between the major Allied bases at New Caledonia and Espiritu Santo, supporting the Allied ground forces at Guadalcanal and Tulagi against any Japanese counteroffensives, covering the movement of supply ships to Guadalcanal, and engaging and destroying any Japanese warships, especially carriers, that came within range.〔 p. 106.〕 The area of ocean in which the U.S. carrier task forces operated was known as "Torpedo Junction"〔Frank, ''Guadalcanal'', p. 335.〕 by U.S. forces because of the high concentration of Japanese submarines in the area.〔Hammel, ''Carrier Strike'', p. 6–7.〕 On 31 August, ''USS Saratoga (CV-3)'' was torpedoed by and was out of action for three months for repairs.〔Hammel, ''Carrier Strike'', p. 10–12.〕〔After this incident the then U.S. carrier task force commander Frank Jack Fletcher was relieved of his command and reassigned to shore duty for the remainder of the war. Frank, ''Guadalcanal'', p. 204–205〕 On 14 September, ''USS Wasp (CV-7)'' was hit by three torpedoes fired by Japanese submarine while supporting a major reinforcement and resupply convoy to Guadalcanal and almost engaging two Japanese carriers and (which withdrew just before the two adversaries came into range of each other's aircraft). With power knocked out from torpedo damage, ''Wasp''s damage-control teams were unable to contain the ensuing large fires, and she was abandoned and scuttled.〔Evans, ''Japanese Navy'', p. 179–180, Hammel, ''Carrier Strike'', p. 24–41. Battleship and destroyer were also hit by torpedoes during the same attack. ''O'Brien'' later sank as a result of the torpedo damage, and ''North Carolina'' was under repair at Pearl Harbor until November 16, 1942.〕 Although the U.S. now had only one operational carrier (''Hornet'') in the South Pacific, the Allies still maintained air superiority over the southern Solomon Islands because of their aircraft based at Henderson Field on Guadalcanal. However, at night, when aircraft were not able to operate effectively, the Japanese were able to operate their ships around Guadalcanal almost at will. Thus, a stalemate in the battle for Guadalcanal developed, with the Allies delivering supplies and reinforcements to Guadalcanal during the day, and the Japanese doing the same by warship (called the "Tokyo Express" by the Allies) at night, with neither side able to deliver enough troops to the island to secure a decisive advantage. By mid-October, both sides had roughly an equal number of troops on the island.〔Hammel, ''Carrier Strike'', p. 19–21, 84–85.〕 The stalemate was briefly interrupted by two large-ship naval actions. On the night of 11/12 October, a U.S. naval force intercepted and defeated a Japanese naval force en route to bombard Henderson Field in the Battle of Cape Esperance. But just two nights later, a Japanese force that included the battleships and successfully bombarded Henderson Field, destroying most of the U.S. aircraft and inflicting severe damage on the field's facilities.〔Frank, ''Guadalcanal'', p. 316–319.〕 Although still marginally operational, it took several weeks for the airfield to recover from the damage and replace the destroyed aircraft. At this time, the U.S. made two moves to try to break the stalemate in the battle for Guadalcanal. First, repairs to ''Enterprise'' were expedited so that she could return to the South Pacific as soon as possible. On 10 October, ''Enterprise'' received her new air groups; on 16 October, she left Pearl Harbor; and on 23 October,〔Hammel, ''Carrier Strike'', p. 154–155.〕 she arrived back in the South Pacific and rendezvoused with ''Hornet'' and the rest of the Allied South Pacific naval forces on 24 October, northeast of Espiritu Santo.〔McGee, ''The Solomons Campaigns'', p. 145.〕 Second, on 18 October, Admiral Chester Nimitz, Allied Commander-in-Chief of Pacific Forces, replaced Vice Admiral Robert L. Ghormley with Vice Admiral William Halsey, Jr. as Commander, South Pacific Area: this position commanded Allied forces involved in the Solomon Islands campaign.〔McGee, ''The Solomons Campaigns'', p. 134.〕 Nimitz felt that Ghormley had become too myopic and pessimistic to lead Allied forces effectively in the struggle for Guadalcanal. Halsey was reportedly respected throughout the U.S. naval fleet as a "fighter."〔Frank, ''Guadalcanal'', p. 334.〕 Upon assuming command, Halsey immediately began making plans to draw the Japanese naval forces into a battle, writing to Nimitz, "I had to begin throwing punches almost immediately."〔Hammel, ''Carrier Strike'', p. 150.〕 The Japanese Combined Fleet was also seeking to draw Allied naval forces into what was hoped to be a decisive battle. Two fleet carriers— and —and one light carrier——arrived at the main Japanese naval base at Truk Atoll from Japan in early October and joined ''Shōkaku'' and ''Zuikaku''. With five carriers fully equipped with air groups, plus their numerous battleships, cruisers, and destroyers, the Japanese Combined Fleet, directed by Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, was confident that it could make up for the defeat at the Battle of Midway.〔Hammel, ''Carrier Strike'', p. 146–149.〕 Apart from a couple of air raids on Henderson Field in October, the Japanese carriers and their supporting warships stayed out of the battle for Guadalcanal in the northwestern area of the Solomon Islands, waiting for a chance to approach and engage the U.S. carriers. With the Japanese Army's next planned major ground attack on Allied forces on Guadalcanal set for 20 October, Yamamoto's warships began to move towards the southern Solomons to support the offensive and to be ready to engage any Allied (primarily U.S.) ships, especially carriers, that approached to support the Allied defenses on Guadalcanal.〔Hara, ''Japanese Destroyer Captain'', p. 124–125. According to Hara, the Japanese believed that U.S. Navy forces were likely to be in the Solomon Islands area because they had read a report from the United Press dated 20 October that stated that the United States Navy was preparing for a major sea and air battle in the South Pacific.〕 抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』 ■ウィキペディアで「Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands」の詳細全文を読む スポンサード リンク
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